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Abstract
One hotly debated philosophical question in the analysis of evolutionary
theory concerns whether or not evolution and the various factors which consti-
tute it (selection, dri, mutation, and so on) may protably be considered as
analogous to “forces” in the traditional, Newtonian sense. Several compelling
arguments assert that the force picture is incoherent, due to the peculiar na-
ture of genetic dri. I consider two of those arguments here – that dri lacks
a predictable direction, and that dri is constitutive of evolutionary systems
– and show that they both fail to demonstrate that a view of genetic dri as a
force is untenable. I go on to diagnose the reasons for the stubborn persistence
of this problem, considering two open philosophical issues and oering some
preliminary arguments in support of the force metaphor.
Keywords evolutionary theory; genetic dri; force; causation; Brownian mo-
tion
1. Introduction
Evolutionary theory can, as we all know, be decomposed into multiple components
or factors. It characterizes change in populations over time, that is, as the result
of natural selection, genetic dri, mutation (Mani and Clarke, 1990; Merlin, 2010),
migration (Shpak and Proulx, 2007), linkage disequilibrium (Lewontin and Kojima,
1960; Lewontin, 1964), meiotic drive (Lyttle, 1993), extinction (Lynch et al., 1995;
Jablonski, 2005), increase in complexity (McShea, 1996, 2005; Carroll et al., 2001),
and so on. A natural philosophical question to ask of the evolutionary process, then,
is this: what is the relationship between these “component” theories and the overall
trajectory of evolution?
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One common approach to answering this question has been to draw an analogy
between evolutionary theory and Newtonian mechanics – in particular, to describe
these elements of evolution as component forces, and overall, observed evolutionary
change as the eect of the “net” or “resultant” force that is their “sum.”is analogy,
despite its ubiquity, has come in for serious criticism over the last decade.
In this paper, I will evaluate two arguments against the force interpretation of
evolutionary theory – in particular, arguments that genetic dri cannot be considered
as a force, and hence that the entire force metaphor fails.e rst is the (by now, well-
trodden) claim that genetic dri, though its expected magnitude may be determined
by the eective population size, lacks a direction speciable or predictable in advance.1
Since all Newtonian forces, it is said, must have speciable magnitudes and directions,
dri cannot be considered a force, and the metaphor thus falls apart.e second
argument claims that it is a category mistake to consider dri a force which impinges
upon populations. It is, rather, the default state in which populations nd themselves.
All real-world evolving populations will dri, and thus to describe dri as an “external”
force is misleading. Both of these critiques, I will show, miss the mark – if the force
metaphor is untenable, it is not for either of these reasons.
is claim, in turn, raises another important question: how ought we evaluate
the force metaphor as a whole, aer these two arguments are set aside? I will not oer
a complete evaluation of this issue here, but as a rst step toward a solution I will
describe two philosophical issues central to the debate over the use of the Newtonian
metaphor in evolutionary theory, and oer some preliminary support for the force
interpretation.
2. The Force Metaphor
Philosophical work on the relationship between evolution’s component factors and
resulting overall evolutionary change has recently focused on the causal picture
implied by the structure of evolutionary theory. Where are we to nd the causes
in evolutionary theory? Do any of the component theories describe independent
causes? If so, which ones? And if there are such component causes, how do they
combine to produce the resultant trajectory of populations through time? Two broad
positions on these questions have crystallized. One, the “statisticalist” interpretation
of evolutionary theory (e.g., Walsh et al., 2002; Matthen and Ariew, 2002), claims that
these components – in particular, natural selection and genetic dri – are not causal.
Rather, the causes at work function at the level of individual organisms and their
biochemistry: individual instances of survivals, deaths, predations, mutations, and so
forth. All these “higher-level” theories, then, constitute quite useful, but not causal,
ways in which we may statistically combine events to enable us to grasp interesting
1. Note that, contra the claim of Filler (and many others) that the magnitude of dri is represented
by population size (Filler, 2009, p. 777), population size only determines the distribution of dri
outcomes, and hence the expected magnitude of dri. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing
out this fact.
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trends within populations of causally interacting individuals.2
e other view, the “causalist” interpretation (e.g.,Millstein, 2002, 2006; Shapiro
and Sober, 2007), considers all of these factors to be genuinely causal. Evolution causes
changes in populations, and selection, mutation, migration, genetic dri, etc. do so
as well. How exactly we specify these causes varies (about which more later) – for
example, as dierent varieties of “sampling” (Hodge, 1987), as population-level causal
processes (Millstein, 2006), or as supervening on lower-level causes (Shapiro and
Sober, 2007) – but they are causal nonetheless.
is heated debate has produced much work on an allied problem which will
be the topic of my discussion here.3 It is a common pedagogical trope in the teaching
of biology to describe all of these factors as component forces, each of which propels a
population in a dierent direction through some space (of morphologies, phenotypes,
genotypes, etc.) with a dierent strength, combining, in some sense, to produce the
population’s overall evolutionary trajectory over time. Crow and Kimura introduce
a discussion of equilibrium under selection pressure by noting that “ordinarily one
regards selection as the strongest force inuencing gene frequencies” (1970, p. 262).
Hartl and Clark discuss the possibility of balancing mutation and dri, writing that
“there are many forces in population genetics that act in opposition to one another,
and it is this tension that makes for interesting behavior at the population level. [ . . . ]
Merely because these two forces are in opposition, it does not guarantee that there
will be a stable balance between them” (1997, p. 294). Strickberger argues that since
mutational equilibrium is not reached in many natural populations, “other forces
must be responsible for the establishment of gene frequencies” (1968, p. 719).is
pedagogical pattern is even common at the secondary level: in a chapter titled “e
Forces of Evolutionary Change,” Lewis summarizes natural selection, nonrandom
mating, mutation, migration, and genetic dri in a force-like diagram (1997, p. 412).
I have quoted from several textbooks to demonstrate the pervasiveness of
the ‘force’ metaphor at all levels of biological pedagogy. But what of it? Why is this
particular biological turn of phrase of philosophical interest? Depew, for example,
argues rather persuasively that this should, at best, be seen to be deployed for rhetorical
purposes – part and parcel of an attempt to couch the optimizing and maximizing
eects of natural selection in language which avoids “the ascription of intentions and
rational choice” (2013, p. 138).
Writing o the force interpretation this quickly, though, is a mistake. In his
original introduction of what would become the causalist interpretation, Sober (1984)
inuentially described evolutionary theory as a theory of forces. Sober’s invocation of
Newtonian mechanics is not merely semantic – it is intended to carry some genuine
2. I have described the statisticalist position in a univocal way here, though I suspect that there is as
great a diversity of positions among those in the “statisticalist” camp as that in the “causalist” camp
which I will describe later. Compare, for example, the positions reected in Lewens (2010), Walsh
(2010), and Matthen and Ariew (2009).
3. I should also pause to set aside another facet of this debate: the distinction between the processes
and products of evolution (the classic source here is Millstein, 2002). In the following, I mean to refer
only to the processes of evolution, as it is clear that this is the feature to which the force interpretation
is directed.
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explanatory weight. Allowing, of course, that the analogy here is not entirely precise,
he claims that just as component, causal forces are summed together to determine
the net force acting on a body in Newtonian dynamics, a force-like understanding
is the right way to picture not only the metaphorical structure of evolution, but its
causal structure as well. Sober writes that in addition to work on the history of life,
evolutionary biology has also developed a theory of forces.is describes
the possible causes of evolution. e various models provided by the
theory of forces describe how a population will evolve if it begins in a
certain initial state and is subject to certain causal inuences along the
way. (Sober, 1984, p. 27)
On this picture, which I have interchangeably called the “force metaphor” and the
“force interpretation,” we draw an analogy between the structure of Newtonian me-
chanics and the structure of evolutionary theory. As has been repeatedly emphasized,
however – most recently and thoroughly by Hitchcock and Velasco (2014) – this is not
to say that the two theories are perfectly analogous. Indeed, the question, as Lewens
has aptly phrased it, is “in what respects selection and dri resemble Newtonian
forces, and in what ways they dier, paying attention all the time to the dangers of a
seductive metaphor” (2010, p. 316). To at least some extent, then, proponents of the
force interpretation hold that the force “metaphor” is no metaphor at all – at least
some components of evolutionary theory really can be described as forces.e force
interpretation’s detractors hold that such language is at best merely suggestive, if not
entirely devoid of value.4
If true, the force interpretation makes evolution, in the apt terminology de-
ployed by Maudlin, a “quasi-Newtonian” theory (2004, p. 431). “ere are, on the
one hand, inertial laws that describe how some entities behave when nothing acts
on them, and then there are laws of deviation that specify in what conditions, and
in what ways, the behavior will deviate from the inertial behavior” (Maudlin, 2004,
p. 431).is is, Maudlin notes, a very natural way for us to understand the behavior
of systems: whether or not the laws of a given system are amenable to such analysis,
we like to produce quasi-Newtonian theories.5
ere are many reasons why such a ‘force’ picture of evolutionary theory might
be interesting or useful (even those as mundane as the subjective preference noted
by Maudlin), but I want to draw out one in particular. If the statisticalist picture is
the correct way to understand evolutionary theory, then the original question with
which we began – how to explain the manner in which the various component parts
of evolutionary theory combine to produce observed evolutionary change – may be
answered in a straightforward manner.e standard tools of statistics are aimed, at
4. I will continue using “the force interpretation” and “the force metaphor” interchangeably in the
following, recognizing throughout that the question up for debate is the extent to which force
language can be said to truly describe evolving systems.
5. A very similar explanation of the general structure of ‘force’-theories is oered by Ellis (1963, 1976),
who divides states of a system between “natural” states of aairs that do not require “a continuing
causal explanation” and “unnatural” states which do require such explanation – and this separation
is a matter of a domain-specic demarcation of the relevant “natural” states.
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least in part, at resolving precisely this problem: we know how dierent statistical
distributions combine to produce resultant distributions, and in the absence of any
invocation of causation, this mathematical story is the only story required.
But the case is dierent when we turn to the causal interpretation. If all these
components of evolution – natural selection, genetic dri, mutation, migration, etc. –
are independently theorized, described separately from one another, and yet are all
supposed to invoke causal processes that act on the same system, the question of how
this combination is to proceed becomes more relevant. Of course, we know what the
result of such a combination will be (it is specied by the equations of population
genetics, or life-history theory, or evolutionary ecology, etc.). But how ought we to
think about multiple independent causal inuences combining together into a single
“resultant” cause?e force metaphor can provide us with an answer. For if the pieces
are independent and causal in the same way as Newtonian forces, then we have a
ready understanding of the concept of overall evolutionary change by analogy with
net or resultant force.6
3. What is Genetic Drift?
If the invocation of quasi-Newtonian forces is a natural way to analyze theories, gives
us a handle on how the various components of evolutionary theory might work
together, and has been frequently invoked by biologists, then what is the issue? To
begin, it is clear that the use of force language in the more substantive, causally loaded
sense of Sober opens the force-theorist to an additional line of argument that would
not be germane to other varieties of the causal view.7 For we now must ask about the
soundness of this appropriation of Newtonian force. Should selection and dri be
treated in this way, or not?
One recurring diculty with adopting the force metaphor is the issue of genetic
dri: a common refrain in this debate claims that considering dri to be similar to a
Newtonian force is highly problematic. In the next two sections, I will evaluate two
arguments for this claim (and nd both lacking), but we should begin with a brief
synopsis of what sorts of evolutionary inuences are commonly subsumed under the
label of ‘genetic dri’.
In his helpful review of its history and scope within biology, Beatty (1992) notes
that surprisingly little unies the phenomena known as genetic dri. While “most of
6.is point, as with all issues in the causalist/statisticalist debate, is also a matter of some debate.
Importantly, if this analogy is to hold, a suitable analogue of “vector addition” must be found for the
evolutionary case. Matthen and Ariew (2002, pp. 66–68) push this point forcefully, framing it in
terms of the inability to compare dierent values of “vernacular tness.” Considering the debate
over tness would take us too far aeld here; the causalist can, however, respond by providing a new
model of tness which can be compared across dierent biological contexts (Pence and Ramsey,
2013), or elucidating a non-additive model of force composition (Stephens, 2010).
7. Early in the debate between causalists and statisticalists, this point was oen missed – Matthen and
Ariew (2002), for example, take it to be a point against the causal interpretation itself that genetic
dri cannot be described as a force.is entails, at best, that the force metaphor should be discarded,
not that the causal interpretation is untenable, a point stressed by Stephens (2004) and Millstein
(2006).
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the phenomena so designated have in common . . . one or another biological form
of random or indiscriminate sampling,” this will not even suce to demarcate its
complete scope, as “there are phenomena sometimes included in the category of
random dri that have nothing to do with random sampling” (Beatty, 1992, p. 273).
We have little choice but to work by example.
Perhaps the most common use of genetic dri among philosophers refers to
what Hodge called “fortuitous dierential reproduction in the accumulation of ran-
dom or indiscriminate errors of sampling” (1987, p. 233), an invocation of indiscrimi-
nate sampling processes, sampling processes which do not take into account dierences
of tness between organisms. Oen, philosophers instantiate this indiscriminate sam-
pling by invoking “a natural catastrophe that kills all the nearby members of a species
indiscriminately, resulting by chance in a change in frequency of the various types
within the species” (Beatty, 1992, p. 274).8 Natural selection, on such a view, consists
of those drivers of population change that are sensitive to dierences in tness values,
while genetic dri consists of those causes (like, presumably, natural disasters) for
which tness dierences are irrelevant.9
Another process responsible for genetic dri is to be found inMendelian seg-
regation. In sexually reproducing, diploid organisms like humans, each individual
carries two copies of each gene. In sexual reproduction, ospring receive one copy
from each of their parents. Parents will therefore pass only one of their alleles on to
each of their ospring.is entails that, merely as a matter of chance, it is possible for
an allele to change frequency or even disappear entirely from a population in a single
generation: if all parents carrying one allele (call it ‘A’) also carry a second, dierent
allele (call it ‘a’; we call such organisms ‘heterozygous’), and all happen to pass the ‘a’
allele to their ospring, the ‘A’ allele will vanish. Since this dramatic population change
comes about without the inuence of natural selection or any other evolutionary
factors, this is a clear instance of genetic dri.
Whichever of these (and other) evolutionary factors we choose in the end to call
‘genetic dri’,10 we can discern enough common threads to move forward – genetic
dri is intended to encompass stochastic or random inuences on populations whose
eects do not depend on dierences in the tnesses of individual organisms or their
traits. And this is enough of a handle on genetic dri to motivate our two objections
to the reading of genetic dri as a force.
8.is conception of genetic dri as indiscriminate, lethal natural disaster is pervasive in the phi-
losophy of biology (see, e.g., Beatty, 1984; Millstein, 2002; Sterelny, 2003; Gildenhuys, 2009), and
unfortunate insofar as biologists are oen much more concerned with many of the other notions of
dri mentioned here, as these are more frequently found in natural populations.
9.is view comes, of course, from one side of the causalist/statisticalist debate, and hence is a matter
of signicant controversy.e characterization of dri it provides, however, is well known, and
serves as an example of the general trend I identify below.
10. Beatty (1992) also mentions neutral mutations, the founder eect, and even (though such a view
is now outmoded) the causes of any non-adaptive characters as factors which have, at various
historical moments, been considered to be varieties of dri.
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4. The Direction of Drift
It is by now an old chestnut in this debate that genetic dri lacks a speciable or
predictable direction. To cite only two examples, Matthen and Ariew (2002, p. 61)
note as an aside that “in any case, dri is not the sort of thing that can play the role of
a force – it does not have predictable and constant direction.” Brandon (2006) adopts
the same argument, and it is one of the central motivations behind his development
of the “zero-force evolutionary law” (Brandon, 2006, 2010; McShea and Brandon,
2010).
e basic outline is straightforward. As we have already seen, genetic dri is a
stochastic process. Consider once again a population which is uniformly heterozygous
for some trait ‘Aa’ – all members of the population possess one copy of the ‘A’ allele
and one copy of ‘a’. Assuming no selection, mutation, or other evolutionary forces
act on the population, genetic dri will eventually drive this population toward
homozygosity, uniformity at either ‘AA’ or ‘aa’, with one of the two alleles removed
from the population.is is because the states in which all members of the population
are homozygous for either ‘AA’ or ‘aa’ are what we might call “absorbing barriers”
– once a population has lost all of its ‘A’ or ‘a’ alleles (and again, given that there is
no mutation), it is “stuck” at the uniform homozygous state.e “random walk” of
genetic dri will, given enough time, eventually arrive and remain at one or the other
of these permanent states.
Here, then, is the rub – the populationwill arrive at one of these states, but which
will be its eventual fate is a matter of chance. In this sense, at least, the population-
level outcome of genetic dri is random.11 It is obvious, the argument concludes, that
dri cannot act as a Newtonian force, because Newtonian forces have determinate
directions. Consider natural selection.e direction in which selection will drive
a population is indeed speciable in advance: selection drives populations in the
direction of increased tness. We may even visualize the “adaptive landscape” in the
absence of any actual populations, specifying the direction of the selective force prior
to any actual population’s experiencing it.12 Such analysis is clearly impossible for
dri, and dri cannot therefore be described as a force.
Two responses on behalf of the force metaphor have been oered. In our initial
discussion of dri above, driwas described fairly clearly in directional terms: it drives
populations toward homozygosity, i.e., it “tends to remove variation from natural
populations” (Stephens, 2010, p. 721; see also Stephens, 2004, pp. 563–564). Insofar
as this is a direction, we may avoid the objection.ere are several reasons that we
might be worried about this response, however. First, Filler has argued persuasively
that if we are too liberal with our force metaphor, we run the risk of sapping the
11.is means that, at a minimum, there is a subjective sense of “chance” and “randomness” at work
here (i.e., we are unable to predict the outcome of the process of dri). Whether or not there exists
a stronger type of “chance” underlying genetic dri, and what exactly this sense might amount to,
seems to hinge in large part on the result of the debate over dri’s causal potency (see Rosenberg,
2001).
12.ough see Pigliucci andKaplan (2006, ch. 8) for some of the diculties with the adaptive landscape
metaphor.
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notion of ‘force’ of all its explanatory power. Imagine, for example, a slightly modied
version of Molière’s classic satire of opium’s “dormitive virtue.” We could construct
a “fatigue-space” in which sleep sits at the end of one axis, and then describe a
“dormitive force” which drives persons up the sleep axis. Ascribe this “dormitive force”
to opium, and we have come close to completing Molière’s folly, providing a nearly
empty “explanation” for opium’s causing sleep (Filler, 2009, pp. 779–780). Given
a particularly broad concept of force, there is thus a continuum of possible force
explanations, ranging from entirely vacuous or circular to quite informative. Lacking
any argument about the location of genetic dri on this continuum, we don’t know
whether or not “heterozygosity-space” gives us vacuous, empty force explanations,
or genuinely useful explanations – if the former, then the “toward homozygosity”
response to this objection fails.
Second, “toward homozygosity” appears to be a direction in the wrong sort of
state-space for descriptions of genetic dri.13 Selection, by comparison, drives trait
frequencies in the direction of some particular trait (or genotype), the one with the
highest tness immediately reachable from the population’s present state. In such a
space, “toward homozygosity” ismore than one direction at once – in a population
of hybrid ‘Aa’ organisms, say, it is a “direction” toward both ‘AA’ and ‘aa’. It is only
a unitary direction in some higher-level or second-order space, with a single axis
running from homozygosity to heterozygosity.
Finally, another worry about “toward homozygosity” as a direction for dri is
that it seems to confuse the question of which phenomena dri is intended to describe.
Asmentioned above, dri has a direction toward homozygosity predictable in advance
insofar as (in the absence of mutation and migration) homozygosity constitutes a
set of absorbing barriers for the state of a population.at is, the population tends
toward homozygosity in the long run only because once one of the alleles is removed
from the population, there is no way for it to be reintroduced. Were this not the case,
dri would simply be a random walk.e phenomena that are genuinely “due to”
dri, that is, are not the homozygous states (which it would be more natural to say
are “due to” the absence of mutation and migration). Dri, rather, accounts for the
behavior of the population between these barriers, and the behavior it would have
were the barriers absent – namely, the randomwalk.us, to describe dri as directed
“toward homozygosity” incorrectly takes an incidental claim about the absence of
mutation and migration to be a central feature of dri itself.14
We have several independent reasons, then, for suspecting that the defense of
the force view by dening dri as directed “toward homozygosity” is problematic. If
this is true, we must look for another way to resolve the trouble with dri’s direction,
and the second available response turns to the denition of ‘force’ itself. Perhaps the
trouble with the objection lies in its rigorous adherence to the claim that forces must
13. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this objection.
14. Another way to see this is to note that in a population with only selection acting (with a non-zero
selection coecient), in the absence of mutation and migration, we could also equally well predict
that the population will arrive at an absorbing barrier and stay there.e existence of the barriers
has nothing to do with the process driving the population change. I thank an anonymous reviewer
for pointing me toward this analogy.
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have directions predictable in advance.15 Could we discard this requirement without
discarding the explanatory power that the notion of a ‘force’ provides us?
One attempt to do so is oered by Filler (2009, pp. 780–782). He argues that we
may harvest two specic criteria for forces from the literature on Newtonian systems
(criteria argued for by Bigelow et al., 1988): namely, that forces be both precisely
numerically speciable in magnitude and able to unify our explanations of a large
array of phenomena. Such criteria, it is presumed (though not argued), would forestall
cases like the “dormitive force” while permitting genetic dri. Even if they do not,
however, Filler notes that “we could still posit a continuum of forces with maximally
precise and unifying forces on one end andmathematically vague andweakly unifying
forces on the other” (Filler, 2009, p. 781).
What of this attempt to salvage the force view? In general, I am broadly sym-
pathetic with the tactic of carefully weakening the criteria for ‘force’-hood. I would
like, however, to support the same conclusion by a slightly dierent line of argu-
ment. While the literature that Filler cites to establish mathematical speciability
and unifying power as desiderata for forces is valuable, I am concerned about it for
two reasons. First, given that these criteria are oered by Filler without providing
an analysis of genetic dri or any other forces, they seem dangerously close to being
ad hoc additions to our force concept. Is there a principled argument for why these
criteria should be added to that of directionality, in general? Such an argument would,
it seems, be best phrased in the context of an understanding of what exactly the use
of ‘forces’ is to do for us, and when explanations utilizing a force metaphor are useful
or perspicuous. I will come back to this issue in section 6.1, but for now it will suce
to note that we do not possess such an account. Second, Filler does not oer a direct
argument that genetic dri satises these criteria, so we can’t yet be sure that the
argument he provides gives us the result that we’re looking for.16
I believe both of these decits can be remedied by comparing genetic dri to a
dierent force that is oen invoked in Newtonian dynamics: Brownianmotion. If, that
is, we cannot in general describe when force metaphors have utility, we may protably
turn to the physicists themselves as arbiters of a “successful” use of force-explanations.
e use of a stochastic force in physics would, then, give us a reason – though a
defeasible reason, to be sure – that this argument against considering genetic dri to
be a force fails.
4.1. Brownian Motion
My claim, then, is this: whatever our general analysis of a force winds up being, it
happens to be the case that we already countenance examples of forces that do, indeed,
have stochastically specied directions – and as an example, we can consider the force
of Brownian motion.is argument is admittedly less ambitious than that of Filler –
15.e claim that forces must have speciable directions appears, at least, inMatthen and Ariew (2002);
Stephens (2004); Brandon (2005, 2006); Wilson (2007); and Massin (2009).
16.ough it is certainly the case that the argument in favor of mathematical unication is relatively
straightforward, given that “dri” explanations unify a wide variety of empirical/causal phenomena.
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Figure 1: A simulation of a particle released at (0, 0) undergoing Brownianmovement.
Inspired by Perrin’s drawing of the Brownian motion of colloidal particles in water,
viewed under the microscope (Figure 6 of Perrin, 1909, p. 81).
we do not, for example, wind up with enough theoretical resources to fully specify
the continuum from paradigm cases of forces to fringe cases. But we do have what
we need to block the objection that genetic dri cannot be considered to be a force
thanks to its stochastically specied direction.
Brownian motion is a common occurrence.e behavior of dust particles as
they oat through a sunny window or a glass of water is governed in large part by
the manner in which they collide with the molecules of the uid in which they are
suspended (see gure 1). Since the motion of the uid molecules is itself modeled
stochastically (with the tools of statistical mechanics), it is unsurprising that Brownian
motion in turn is a stochastic force.
What does the formal representation of a stochastic classical force look like?
e now-standard derivation of the mathematics of Brownian motion was provided






+ X . (1)
is is a stochastic dierential equation, with x representing the location of the
particle within the uid, m its mass, a damping coecient −6piµa (which describes
the manner in which the viscosity of the uid through which the particle moves slows
its travel), and a random “noise term” X, which describes the actual eect of the
collisions with uid molecules.
A few observations about this equation are in order. First, it is written as an
equation for a force: m ⋅ d2x/dt2 is just mass times acceleration, so we could equiva-
lently have written F = −6piµa ⋅ dx/dt + X. Nor need one quibble that the dierential
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equation specifying this force references the particle’s velocity, dx/dt. Equations for
many other forces do so as well, including friction in air or water (drag). Secondly,
the “source” of the randomness here is obvious, coming entirely from the noise term
X. About it, Langevin says that “we know that it is indierently positive and negative
and that its magnitude is such that it maintains the agitation of the particle, which
the viscous resistance would stop without it” (Lemons and Gythiel, 1997, p. 1081).
Finally, the force described by this equation bears all of the same “problematic”
characteristics as genetic dri. Most importantly, its direction can by no means be
predicted in advance: nothing about the direction of the force described by equation
(1) is “determinate” in this sense. It depends entirely on the noise term which, as
Langevin notes, “indierently” (that is to say, randomly) changes sign and magnitude
as the system evolves.e same is, of course, true of genetic dri, under which (at
least on the simplest models of dri) an allele’s frequency is equally likely to increase
or decrease at each point in time.e example of Brownian motion, therefore, oers
us a case in which the notion of ‘force’ is weakened in precisely the way required to
countenance genetic dri – by admitting forces that vary in direction stochastically
over time.
e opponents of the force view still have one obvious way to respond to this
argument.ey might reject outright the extension of force talk to both Brownian
motion and genetic dri. While this is a perfectly coherent choice, I am not certain
what the motivation for it would be. Of course, when we introduce a stochastic force,
we introduce an element of unpredictability into our system, rendering null one of
the primary benets of a classical, force-based picture: the ability to use information
about component force values to make determinate, advance predictions about the
behavior of systems. But we already lack the ability to make such detailed predictions
of individual biological systems (or systems experiencing Brownian motion) – why
would we think that a force-based view of evolutionary theory would somehow make
them possible?e question, rather, is simply whether it is possible to maintain a
“net-force” picture of evolutionary theory which includes the randomness of genetic
dri, and the example of Brownian motion shows this to be clearly achievable, should
we be inclined to do so.
Further, just because their directions cannot be described in advance does
not mean that these stochastic forces somehow cannot be taken into account in the
development of models.e Wright-Fisher model of genetic dri has spawned much
research in population genetics as a computational/mathematical model of the action
of genetic dri, and, similarly, Brownian motion can be taken into account in models
of uid dynamics when it is taken to be an important factor (see, e.g., Huilgol and
Phan-ien, 1997). What matters, that is, is that we are able to (1) describe the causal
structure of evolutionary theory in general, and (2) when needed, predict (using the
“resultant force”) the future trajectory of a given population. Stochastic forces cause
no problem for either of these requirements.
Finally, it seems that many authors in the debates over the causal structure of
evolution either explicitly tolerate or make room for stochastic forces such as these.
Stochastic forces are, therefore, already present in many accounts of the structure
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of evolution (whether explicitly or implicitly).17McShea and Brandon, for example,
when discussing how we might arrive at the “correct” distribution of evolutionary
causes into forces, note their skepticism that “there are objective matters of fact that
settle what counts as forces in a particular science, and so what counts as the zero-
force condition” (2010, p. 102).at is, while objective features of the natural world
can settle what causal inuences are at work in a given system, they cannot, according
to McShea and Brandon, settle how we choose to partition these causal processes
into “forces” – an element of this latter decision is and must remain subjective.18 Even
the statisticalist analysis of Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew describes as a paradigm case
of Newtonian, dynamical explanation the case of a feather, “aected not only by the
force of gravity but also by attractive forces from other bodies, electromagnetic forces,
forces imparted by random movements of the air molecules, etc.” (2002, p. 454, emph.
added). I claim that without further argument, there is little reason to dogmatically
adhere to the requirement that forces have directions speciable in advance.
Of course, this is not to say that deterministic-directional forces and stochastic-
directional forces such as Brownian motion are identical, or that there are not in-
teresting and relevant dierences between deterministic and stochastic forces.e
dynamics of systems in which stochastic forces play a role, for example, will be much
more dicult to describe over the long run, and it has recently been argued that
such long-run descriptions are sometimes required to adequately account for some
features of evolution (Pence and Ramsey, 2013). Metaphysical accounts of forces as
either dispositions (Hüttemann, 2009) or causal powers (Massin, 2009) will need to
take account of the fact that those dispositions or causal powers are probabilistic for
these stochastic forces.
But it is important not to overstate these dierences. Deterministic chaosmakes
trouble for dynamical prediction even in complex systems with deterministic forces
(Werndl, 2009), and, as I argued above, the dynamics of evolutionary systems are
made no more dicult to predict by thinking of genetic dri as a force than they are
if we choose not to think of genetic dri as a force.
5. Drift as “Constitutive” of Evolutionary Systems
Another line of attack on the force view, marshaled by Brandon and expanded in his
work with McShea, doesn’t turn on the appropriateness of stochastic-direction forces.
Rather, it claims that it is a category mistake (or something close to it) to consider
dri as an external force that acts on biological systems. Dri, on the contrary, is
“part and parcel of a constitutive process of any evolutionary system,” and is therefore
17. Notably, if evolutionary forces may be stochastic, then it is likely that selection is best considered as
a stochastic force as well. While I lack the space here to pursue all the consequences of this claim, it
sharpens the debate between Millstein and Brandon over the distinction between natural selection
and genetic dri (Brandon and Carson, 1996; Millstein, 2002; Brandon, 2005; Millstein, 2005), as it
no longer becomes possible to simply sort evolution into its “deterministic” and “indeterministic”
components. I thank an anonymous reviewer for noting this implication.
18. Such conventionalism about what is to count as a force is echoed in several places in the literature
(e.g., Ellis, 1976; Stephens, 2010); see Forster (1988) for opposition.
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found in any set of circumstances in which evolution is possible.19 “Force” talk, on
the other hand, should be reserved for forces which appear in “special” circumstances.
In the biological case, mutation, selection, and migration (among others) are “special”
forces, but dri, as a “constitutive” component of evolution, is not – it is part of the
“zero-force” state of evolutionary systems (Brandon, 2006, p. 325).20
To help elucidate this argument further, return toMaudlin’s discussion of “quasi-
Newtonian” systems as mentioned in section 2 (2004, p. 431). Maudlin points out
a very valuable psychological or motivational distinction between our inertial or
zero-force laws and our deviation or force laws. Namely, the zero-force conditions
are supposed to describe the behavior of a body when, in some particularly relevant
sense, nothing is happening to it. As is familiar from the Newtonian case, inertial or
zero-force conditions can only be observed when they aren’t being overwhelmed by
external, second-law forces.us the denition of a relevant or appropriate sense
of what it is for “nothing to be happening” to a system is intimately tied up with the
denition of its inertial or zero-force states.
is sense of “nothing happening,” however, will assuredly be domain-relative,
and a matter of the structure of each theory which we wish to consider in a quasi-
Newtonian manner. McShea and Brandon, then, claim that placing dri on the side of
the force laws – as a second-law, external force – and declaring the Hardy-Weinberg
conditions to constitute the times when “nothing is happening” to a biological system
results in a poor denition of “nothing happening.” When nothing is happening to a
biological system, they argue, it dris. Dri is thus the zero-force or inertial state of
evolutionary systems, revealed by the removal of all external forces (like selection,
mutation, migration, etc.).
To respond, let’s turn again to an analogy with classical mechanics. Recall
from above that a signicant part of Brandon and McShea’s evidence that genetic
dri serves as the zero-force condition for evolutionary theory rests on dri’s nature
as a constitutive, pervasive, or universal characteristic of all real-world evolving
systems. Classical mechanics, in turn, has its own set of highly pervasive forces, such
as gravitation. Following Stephens (2010, p. 721), if this pervasiveness is to count as
evidence that genetic dri features in the zero-force condition for evolution, it should
equally well serve as evidence that gravitation ought to feature in the zero-force
condition for Newtonian mechanics. If this is right, then Newton’s rst law itself is
incorrectly formulated, as it fails to incorporate gravitational interaction. While this
isn’t an outright reductio, it strikes me that any discussion of forces which fails to
19. Or, to be precise, almost any – McShea and Brandon dene dri as a certain kind of population-
level outcome, and it is logically possible (though practically impossible) that dri could produce
precisely the outcomes expected of pure natural selection, over and over again. Any real-world
evolving population, however, will dri in almost all circumstances.
20. I should note that my argument against Brandon and McShea’s objection in this section does not
extend to the coherence or utility of their own, positive ZFEL view. As part of their defense of
ZFEL, however, McShea and Brandon (Brandon, 2006; McShea and Brandon, 2010) argue that
Sober’s traditional view, on which genetic dri is considered as a second-law force, is incoherent.
It is that argument alone which I claim fails. It has also been briey evaluated (and rejected) by
Stephens (2010, p. 721); the approach I oer here goes farther, I believe, toward telling us why this
“default-cause” argument fails.
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handle the paradigm case of Newtonian gravitation is seriously awed.
I suspect, however, that the supporter of this objection has a ready reply – there
is, one might claim, an important and salient dierence between genetic dri and
gravitation. While there may be no Newtonian system which in fact exhibits no
gravitational eects, it is possible to describe in Newtonian terms a system that would
not be subject to gravitation – either by dialing the gravitational constant G back
to zero, or by imagining the behavior of an isolated test mass “at innity,” innitely
distant from all other mass in the universe. Gravitation therefore is not conceptually
necessary for the description of a Newtonian system in the way that dri is for an
evolutionary system.is, I take it, is the explanation for the emphasis of authors like
McShea and Brandon (as well as, e.g., Matthen and Ariew, 2002) on the biological and
biochemical “substrates” of evolution – if evolution cannot be conceptualized without
dri, because it cannot be conceived except as acting within a substrate that entails
the presence of dri, then this, as the reply goes, suces as a sucient dierence
between dri and gravitation.
It is not obvious to me, however, that there is any conceptual diculty in
abstracting genetic dri away from an evolutionary system. Imagine an innite popu-
lation with individuals initially equally distributed among four possible genotypes,
A, B, C, and D. Parents produce ospring identical to themselves, modulo a small
mutation rate. ere exists a selective force, which causes types C and D to have
a 10% chance of dying before reaching reproductive age. Finally, the reproductive
output of each type in the next generation is set in advance: say that all types produce
exactly one ospring if they survive to reproductive age, and then die. Here we have
an example of a thought experiment on which selection exerts an inuence (types C
and D will clearly eventually die out), mutation has an inuence (due to the non-zero
mutation rate), but genetic dri has none.e population is innite, so we have no
bottleneck eects or eects of nite population size. Further, each individual has a
guaranteed reproductive outcome from birth, based upon its type – and to the extent
that these outcomes are probabilistic, this is the inuence of selection or mutation,
not dri. Indeed, we can predict that in the long run, the population will consist of
roughly half A organisms and half B.21
Is there anything more outlandish about this dri-free toy model than an
example consisting of a universe containing only one isolated and non-extended
point mass, free of gravitation, or a test mass at innite distance from all other
masses? Clearly there are no innite populations in the real world, but here it seems
we have a perfectly tenable thought-experiment on which we may separate the eect
of dri from all the other evolutionary forces, and then reduce that eect to zero.
For that matter, the way in which the expected behavior of both systems is inferred
seems to be identical: just as the physicist imagines the limiting case of smaller and
smaller values of G, the biologist imagines larger and larger population sizes.ere
is nothing any more “constitutive” about dri for evolutionary systems than there is
21. With a small, but predictable, fraction of newly-arisen mutants. Strictly speaking, this discussion
concerns behavior in the limit as population size approaches innity, as an actually innite popula-
tion cannot be divided into proportions in this way.is example was beneted by the discussion
of dri in Ramsey (2013).
14
about gravitation for Newtonian systems.
6. Moving Forward on Forces
In the last two sections, then, I have argued that two prominent objections to con-
sidering genetic dri as a force do not succeed. But this raises an equally important
issue: what should we do with the force metaphor now? Does the removal of these
two objections suce to declare the force metaphor rehabilitated? Such a conclusion
would be too hasty.22 In this section, I will consider two philosophical problems – the
overall structure of force explanations and the varying conceptions of the causalist
interpretation of evolutionary theory. I oer some preliminary support for the force
interpretation here, and I hope that focusing the debate in this way may make a more
general appraisal of its merits possible.
6.1. When are Force Explanations Useful?
Let’s begin by turning back to an issue that I raised while considering the question
of forces with stochastic directions. Resolving this problem by simply adding more
criteria to our concept of ‘force’, such as mathematical speciability, runs the risk
of being an ad hoc modication. e most consistent way to determine whether
or not such additions are ad hoc, it seems, would be to embed them within a clear
understanding of when an explanation that makes reference to forces is useful and
when it is not – that is, to describe the circumstances in which a force explanation
gives us genuine purchase on the structure of systems in the world and when such an
explanation fails to do so.23
ere does exist, of course, an extensive literature considering the appropriate
role and metaphysical character of forces within Newtonian mechanics itself (e.g.,
Wilson, 2007; Bigelow et al., 1988).24We see discussions, for example, of whether or
not a realist interpretation of forces is justied (for realism, see Hesse, 1959; Wilson,
2007; Massin, 2009; for anti-realism, see Jammer, 1957; van Fraassen, 1980), whether
it is individual component forces or the resultant force that ought to be interpreted
realistically (Creary, 1981; Rupert, 2008; Wilson, 2009), or whether forces are causally
intermediate entities, standing between individual objects and the motions that those
objects experience (Bigelow et al., 1988; Wilson, 2007).
22. For one, there exist further objections to the force metaphor in the literature – Stephens (2010), for
example, considers an objection due to Walsh (2007).
23. Notably, this is a dierent enterprise than attempting to search for forces as a project lying within
the metaphysics of science. I believe considerations like those raised by McShea and Brandon’s
conventionalism and Maudlin’s characterization of quasi-Newtonian theories are fairly decisive
that the appropriate question concerns not the existence or ontology of forces, but the explanatory
utility of dierent types of force explanations in dierent circumstances.
24. Wilson (2007, pp. 179–184) raises the interesting possibility that forces in Newtonian mechanics are
not a fundamental depiction of the world, but rather are elements posited by Newtonian mechanics
insofar as it is a special science, just as biology is.is would be yet more evidence closing the
analogical gap between forces in Newtonian theory and forces in biology.
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is literature has not, however, extensively evaluated the legitimacy or useful-
ness of what Maudlin called ‘quasi-Newtonian’ theories – theories which are phrased
in terms of inertial conditions and deviations other than Newtonian mechanics. In
his incisive Concepts of Force, Jammer notes, in terms that might well be amenable to
us here, that the usefulness of the concept of ‘force’ “is that it enables us to discuss the
general laws of motions irrespective of the particular physical situation with which
these motions are situated” (Jammer, 1957, p. 244).25 But even this sophisticated treat-
ment brings under the heading of “Concepts of Force in Contemporary Science” only
the legacy of Newtonian forces in quantum mechanics, nuclear forces, and special
and general relativity.
One notable exception to this general silence on quasi-Newtonian theories is
the work of Ellis (1963, 1976). While his examples still come entirely from physics,
Ellis phrases his approach to forces in a manner general enough to apply outside the
physical sciences. He proposes the following as criteria for a successful use of the
concept of ‘force’:
At its best, a force explanation involves the use of laws of distribution,
combination and action of force. Laws of distribution . . . are laws that
enable us to calculate the magnitude of at least some component of the
resultant force that is acting upon a system. . . . Laws of combination, like
the vector law for addition of forces, are ones that enable us to calculate
the magnitude of the resultant force acting upon a given system from
the magnitudes of its various components. Laws of action of force are
ones that determine the magnitude of the eect to be explained from
a knowledge of the magnitude of the resultant force and of a certain
quantity (the inertial factor) that we say provides us with a measure of
the system’s resistance to the action of that force. (Ellis, 1976, p. 175)
But even this, the best the literature has to oer us for a general discussion of the
applicability of ‘force’ explanations, doesn’t clearly weigh in one way or the other in
the biological case. While proponents of the force metaphor have oered distribution
laws (e.g., the distribution of tness for natural selection, or the size of populations
for genetic dri), combination laws (though these are non-additive, as stressed by
Stephens, 2010), and laws of action (specied by population genetics, for example),
these are not enough to give us a complete evaluation of the force interpretation.
Ellis’s criteria thus fall short, and wemay trace this failure to two sources. First, a
signicant part of what is at issue in the debate over the force metaphor can be seen to
be, in these terms, whether or not the evolutionary laws of distribution, combination,
and action (particularly the non-additive law of combination) are good enough to
serve in the roles demanded of them by Ellis’s understanding of force. To complicate
matters, it’s not obvious which of the various candidates for the laws of distribution
one ought to utilize – consider, for example, the diversity of mathematical analyses of
tness (de Jong, 1994). Second, we haven’t at all engaged with the broader question of
25. Sober (1984, p. 126) invokes a very similar reference to generality in his defense of the separation of
natural selection from genetic dri.
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the overall utility of an explanation phrased in terms of forces.at is, even if we can
write down laws of distribution, combination, and action, we haven’t yet laid down
any criteria as to when and whether such an explanation is benecial, or provides
us with genuine insight into the system being thus explained, as opposed to being
nothing more than a syntactic variant of a non-force-based theory.
e resolution of these sorts of questions would take us far too aeld here. But I
do claim one thing is obvious: some steps toward answering these kinds of questions
about theory structure will be crucial if we are ever to make genuine advances beyond
the current state of the debate on the force interpretation.is is the rst major piece
of open philosophical work forestalling genuine contributions to our understanding
of the force picture.
6.2. The Causalist Interpretations
e second signicant issue to be resolved lies in the framing of the causalist/sta-
tisticalist debate itself. While it is oen presented as a simple, two-sided question,
there are in fact an impressive diversity of ways in which one might adopt a causalist
understanding of evolutionary theory. More importantly for the project here, the
force interpretation is only one of many ways in which one might advocate for the
causalist position. An important and long-overdue ingredient, then, in our evaluation
of the overall success or failure of the force metaphor should be a comparison between
these distinct ways of understanding the causalist project.
At the very least, we need to distinguish between (1) the force interpretation, as
discussed here; (2) the causal process approach (elaborated most notably by Millstein,
2002, 2006, 2013); (3) the causal mechanism approach, rst deployed for natural se-
lection by Barros (2008) and building on the work of Machamer et al. (2000); (4)
themanipulationist approach, discussed by Reisman and Forber (2005), Forber and
Reisman (2007), and Shapiro and Sober (2007), building on the work of Woodward
and Hitchcock (2003); and (5) the counterfactual approach, deployed for natural selec-
tion by Glennan (2009) and Huneman (2012) and utilizing a notion of counterfactual
causal dependence or “relevance.”26 Of course, it is possible – or even likely – that
these are not mutually exclusive. A force may equally well be a manipulable cause,
capable of counterfactual description, or description as a causal process, or of being
more thoroughly explicated by a mechanism. But each of these ways of approach-
ing the problem will come with its own advantages and will guide our theorizing
about evolution in particular directions – thus leaving us with a choice about which
framework is the most perspicuous way of understanding evolutionary theory.
While I certainly will not settle the issue here, the force interpretation has
several advantages with respect to some of these other positions. In particular, I claim
that the force approach can salvage one of the key advantages of the mechanistic view
while not falling prey to one of its most signicant problems.
26. Of course, I have likely le o – or unduly lumped together – further ways in which one could
adopt the causalist position.e relevant, and I believe underappreciated, claim remains, however:
that there is a massive variety of “causalist interpretations” on oer in the literature.
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One distinct advantage that the mechanistic approach has relates to the ability
of mechanisms to cut across ontological levels. For the process, manipulationist,
and counterfactual approaches, the ontological level at which natural selection and
genetic dri operates is a dicult question which depends not only on empirical
input, but also on conceptual clarication – for example, just what sorts of entities
can participate in causal processes, or what kinds of interventions can legitimately
be performed on populations of individuals? Further, the question is taken to have a
univocal answer: either selection and dri can both be located at the population level,
or they can both be located at the individual level.27
e mechanist has more resources at her disposal to resolve this problem. In
their seminal paper on mechanisms, Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000, p. 13)
write that “[t]he levels in these hierarchies should be thought of as part-whole hi-
erarchies with the additional restriction that lower level entities, properties, and
activities are components in mechanisms that produce higher level phenomena.”at
is, mechanisms can readily integrate events that occur at multiple causal levels, and
the architecture of the mechanism is a question to be resolved by empirical input.
e mechanistic approach thus has one fewer purely conceptual problem to resolve
than the process, manipulationist, or counterfactual approaches.
e force theory, however, shares this advantage. Return to our general under-
standing of Newtonian or quasi-Newtonian theories. Earman and Friedman (1973,
p. 337) note that one common approach to the interpretation of the rst law is as a
denition – that is, Newton’s laws hold in inertial frames, where “an inertial frame
is a frame relative to which the ‘law of inertia’ holds, i.e. relative to which a particle
free of impressed forces either remains at rest or else continues in a state of uniform
rectilinear motion.” What would such a reinterpretation do for the evolutionary force
theorist? In short, it renders the domain of applicability of evolutionary forces an
empirical question, just as it is for the mechanist. We interrogate biological systems
to see to what extent they approximate the structure required to instantiate the zero-
force state of Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium – and if the approximation is reasonably
close enough, it may protably then be asked whether such systems are aected by
forces like selection and dri.28
is levels the tables between the force and mechanist approaches. But a nod
can be given toward the force view by considering one problem with the mechanistic
interpretation. A central feature of mechanisms, on the Machamer-Darden-Craver
view, is their regularity:mechanisms are dened as “entities and activities organized
27. To cite a few particular instances, Millstein (2006) spends a signicant amount of time defending
the claim that the causal processes of selection and dri ought to be located at the population level,
Huneman (2012) takes it as assumed that both selection and dri are population-level phenomena,
while Ramsey (2013) situates both at the individual level. Of course, there are manifold problems
inherent in ‘ontological-levels’ talk (Batterman, 1995; Kim, 2002; Heil, 1999, 2003), but we lack any
better way to make reference to the issues I describe here.
28.e fact that there are no real populations which are actually in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium
parallels the well-known fact that there are no inertial frames in real-world Newtonian systems,
only approximations thereto. Also, while I lack the space to pursue the matter here, I believe
this dovetails nicely with biological practice on the units/levels of selection problem. See, for
illuminating discussion and analysis, Pigliucci (2010).
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such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to nish or
termination conditions” (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 3). And regularity in this sense
is dened such that mechanisms “work always or for the most part in the same way
under the same conditions” (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 3). A “stochastic mechanism” –
or, at least, a mechanism which is as stochastic as genetic dri – is a contradiction in
terms, for it fails outright to satisfy the regularity criterion.29
Genetic dri, therefore, does not count as a mechanism, making for a genuine
dierence in kind between genetic dri and natural selection. For the force inter-
pretation, on the other hand, these two are both forces, and this dierence in kind
disappears. On this score, I argue, the force interpretation better matches biological
practice. Dri is certainly interesting, for the reasons discussed here, but in evolu-
tionary theorizing itself we lack the kind of dierence between dri and selection
that such a profound metaphysical distinction would seem to entail.
While these considerations don’t suce to close the case in favor of the force
interpretation, I believe they show, taken together with the refutation of the arguments
against its coherence above, that the force interpretation deserves its place among the
ways in which we might adopt a causalist picture of evolutionary theory.
7. Conclusion
I have here considered two arguments against the conceptual tenability of considering
genetic dri as a “force” like those of Newtonian dynamics.e rst asserted that
genetic dri lacks a predictable direction.is argument fails by virtue of an analogy
with Brownian motion: if Brownian motion is a satisfactory force (and, I have argued,
it is), then so is genetic dri.e second argument against dri-as-force proposed
that dri is a constitutive feature of evolutionary systems.is argument fails because
accepting its premises results in a misunderstanding of the relationship between the
classic Newtonian cases of gravitation and inertia.
We then turned to a broader question: what are we to do with the force inter-
pretation, overall?ese two particular arguments having been set aside, is it the
most appealing way to understand the structure of evolutionary theory? I explored
this in the context of two larger problems, the resolution of each of which would,
I claim, be a boon to this evaluative project. First, in which circumstances does an
explanation phrased in terms of ‘forces’ oer helpful insight into the system being
explained? And second, what are the virtues of the (at least) ve dierent ways in
which we might approach the causalist project? Neither of these questions has been
satisfactorily considered in the literature, though I oered here some considerations
weighing in favor of the force picture.
I have, of course, done nothing here to resolve the overall debate between the
causal and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. But the force metaphor,
as we have seen, does have conceptual utility, is among the (several) plausible ex-
planatory approaches for understanding evolution, and it continues to survive the
29. Alternatively, onemightmodify the account ofmechanism,making room for stochasticmechanism,
as recently and persuasively advocated by DesAutels (2015).
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host of objections raised against it. Determining whether or not it is the best way to
understand the causal structure of evolutionary theory, on the other hand, is a larger
problem – but one to which it is time to devote our eorts.
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